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ABSTRACT
A number of explanations for the severity of the Great Depression focus
on the malfunctioning of the international monetary system. One such
explanation emphasizes the deflationary monetary consequences of the
liquidation of foreign—exchange reserves following competitive devaluations
by Great Britain and her trading partners. Another emphasizes instead the
international monetary policies of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of
France. This paper analyzes both the exceptional behavior of the U.S. and
France and the shift out of foreign exchange after 1930. Uhile both Franco-.
American gold policies and systemic weaknesses of the international monetary
system emerge as important factors in explaining the international
distribution of reserves, the first of these factors turns out to play the






Berkeley, CA 94720Two broad approaches dominate the literature on macroeconomics of the
Great Depression. One, associated mainly with studies of the United States,
emphasizes misguided policy responses at the national level as an explanation
for the Depression's singular depth and long duration. The other, with a long
tradition but associated prominently with the work of Charles Kindleberger,
emphasizes instead the malfunctioning of the international system. The
strength of the first approach is the transparency of the propagation
mechanism, usually taken to be deflationary monetarytrends. The weakness of
the second is precisely the opposite, that the propagation mechanism tends to
be opaque. It is not clear what dimension of the international system
malfunctioned after 1929, nor through what channels its malfunctioning
contributed to the Depression.
A prime suspect is surely the gold-exchange standard of the Interwar
years. That system was a hybrid, neither a pure gold standard like that
which prevailed in various countries prior to World War I nor a fiat money
system like that which succeeded the breakdown of Bretton Woods. As under a
gold standard, countries were required to maintain convertibility between
domestic currency and gold and to leave international gold movements
unfettered. But they were permitted --indeedencouraged --tohold
international reserves in the form of foreign exchange. This introduced into
the operation of the gold standard "a new psychological element never present
before the war."1 When financial crisis culminating in currency
inconvertibility struck the system in 1931, central banks alarmed by
fluctuations in the foreign-exchange value of reserve currencies rushed to—2—
liquidate their foreign asset positions. It is argued that the consequent
reduction in global reserves constrained money supplies in countries required
to maintain statutory ratios of reserves to notes and deposits, heightened the
difficulties of gold bloc countries attempting to defend their gold standard
parities, and exacerbated the monetary deflation associated with the deepening
of the post-1929 slump. As a result of this experience, the gold-exchange
standard has come to be viewed as inherently unstable due to its
susceptibility to the operation of Gresham's Law, and its instability has come
to be viewed as an important part of the explanation for the severity of the
Great Depression.
The gold-exchange standard was adopted in response to the widely
perceived danger of an international shortage of gold.2 Between 1915 and
1925, prices had risen worldwide due to the inflation associated with wartime
finance and postwar reconstruction. These higher prices combined with
economic growth to increase the transactions demand for money. Vet world
money supply was constrained by the availability of reserves. Statutory
regulations prevented central banks from reducing the reserve backing of their
money supplies, while recent experience with inflation deterred politicians
from moving to revise those statutory regulations. The output of newly mined
gold had been depressed since the beginning of World War I, and experts
offered pessimistic forecasts of future supplies. The alternative to
increasing either the supply of monetary gold or the intensity of its
utilization, namely forcing a reduction in the world price level, was viewed
as undesirable since it would only add to the difficulties of an already
troubled world economy.-3-
The solution to this problem was to permit central banks to supplement
the gold backing of their currencies with exchange reserves. Much was done to
encourage the habit. Observers preoccupied by the spectre of a worldwide gold
shortage argued, however, that this practice was never systematized
sufficiently nor carried far enough.According to their interpretation of
events, when deflation set in starting in 1929, the gold shortage had come
home to roost.
There are analytical difficulties with the explanation for interwar
monetary problems that emphasizes a global gold shortage. For one, the danger
of a shortage of gold constraining the volume of transactions was alleviated
by the all but complete removal of gold coin from circulation.3 Hence, the
supply of monetary gold backed a considerably increased volume of central bank
liabilities and supported a relatively stable price level through 1928. The
percentage gold cover of the short-term liabilities of all central banks was
little different in 1928 than it had been in 1913. It is unclear why a gold
shortage, after having exhibited only weak effects in previous years, should
have had such a dramatic impact starting in 1929. As the Gold Delegation of
the League of Nations concluded, "The world's total stock of monetary gold,
apart from any considerations as to its distribution among different
countries, has at all times in recent years been adequate to support the
credit structure legitimately required by world trade and.. .the rapid decline
in prices which began in 1929 cannot be attributed to any deficiency in the
gold supply considered in this sense."5
As this quotation presages, the alternative characterization of the
monetary problem associated with the operation of the gold-exchange standard—4-
emphasizes mismanagement of gold and foreign-exchange reserves rather than
their overal1 insufficiency. There exist two versions of this argument, one
which focuses on the distribution of gold, the other which focuses on the
demand for foreign exchange. The first posits a maldistribution of gold,
blaming France and the United States for imposing deflation on the rest of the
world by absorbing disproportionate shares of global supplies. As the point
was expressed by Britain's Macmillan Committee in the summer of 1931, "The
present distribution of gold is very generally held to be unsatisfactory; a
maldistribution to which is to be attributed a large measure of responsibility
for the heavy fall in prices in recent years."6 Between the ends of 1928 and
1932 French gold reserves rose from $1247 million to $3257 million of constant
gold content, or from 13 to 28 per cent of the world total. The gold backing
of the notes and public deposits of the Banque de France rose from 47 to 78
per cent.7 In the U.S. case, critics complained not of the rate of increase
of gold reserves, which was 8 per cent over the period, but of their high
level. In contrast to the period 1925-28, when the Federal Reserve
facilitated the reconstruction the international gold standard by releasing
substantial quantities of gold, after 1928 the U.S. persistently maintained 35
to 40 per cent of global gold reserves.8 As shown in Table 1, by the end of
1932 France and the U.S. together possessed nearly 63 per cent of the world's
central monetary gold.
The second version of this argument blames the collapse of fixed parities
and central banks' systematic liquidation of foreign assets for reducing the
availability of international reserves just when they were most desperately
needed. Since even those central banks that devalued their currencies wereTable 1. Central Monetary Gold Reserves, 1929—1934













1. Gold bloc 2,240 2,734 3,983 4,632 4,275 4,399
France 1,631 2,099 2,683 3,257 3,015 3,218
Switzerland 115 138 453 477 386 368
Belgium 163 191 354 361 380 348
Netherlands 180 171 357 415 371 338
Poland 79 63 67 56 53 56
Othera 72 72 69 66 70 71
2. U.S.A. and Philippines 3,903 4,228 4,054 4,046 4,013 4,866
3. European countries with exchange
control in 1935 987 988 724 700 670 548













4. British Empire and sterling bloc 1,344 1,380 1,223 1,216 1,584 1,610
United KingdomC 711











Egypt and Siam 19 20 44 61 33 32
European countries with currencies
linked to sterlinge 170 169 159 166 220 221
5. European countries with fluctuating
curriencies not included in 4 above 527 508 472 465 487 488
6. Latin America 715 555 370 363 360 376
Argentina 405 411 252 248 238 238
Brazil 150 11 —— —- —— 4
Other9 160 133 118 115 122 134
7. Japan 542 412 234 212 212 232
World total, excluding U.S.S.R. 10,25810,80511,06011,63411,601 12,519
8. U.S.S.R. 147 249 328 na 416 439
Notes:
a. Danzig, Lithuania, Albania, Algeria, Morocco, Belgian Congo, Netherlands Indies.
b. Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Latvia, Turkey, Yugoslavia.
c. Including Irish Free State.
d. India, Canada, Union of South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, Straits Settlements.
e. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Finland, Estonia.
f. Spain, Austria, Greece.
g. Uruguay, Venezuela, Mexico, Columbia, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and other
countries.
na. Not available.
Source: League of Nations (1935), p. 250.-5—
obliged to back their notes and (in many cases) sight liabilities, the shift
out of foreign exchange, by reducing the available stock of reserves, could
have reduced the money supplies that could be supported. Any one central bank
might succeed in importing additional gold to be used to back an expansion of
its note circulation but only at the expense of heightened monetary stringency
abroad. Between 1928 and 1932 the share of foreign exchange in the reserves
of 24 European countries fell from 42 to 8 per cent (see also Table 2). In
large part this liquidation reflected the persistent efforts of the Banque de
France to convert its foreign assets into gold.9 But when France is excluded,
the share of foreign exchange in the reserves of the remaining 23 countries
still declines dramatically, from 36 per cent in 1928 to 11 per cent in 1932.10
The major portion of the decline in the share of foreign exchange in
global reserves took place between the ends of 1930 and 1931. Prior to 1931,
the share of exchange in the reserve portfolios of 23 European countries,
excluding France, remained steady, varying only between 35 and 40 per cent.11
Between 1930 and 1931, it fell from 35 to 19 per cent. Because of its timing,
this dramatic decline is blamed on the 1931 financial crisis, the imposition
of exchange control in Europe, and the devaluation of sterling, which combined
to undermine faith in the stability of the two reserve currencies, sterling
and the dollar, and induced central banks to substitute gold for foreign
exchange in the effort to avoid capital losses on their reserves.12 To some
extent, the liquidation of exchange reserves was a consequence of central bank
statutes, many of which required the liquidation of sterling reserves once the
pound was rendered inconvertible. But in addition, the newly-introduced
element of risk due to foreign devaluation discouraged central banks fromTable 2. Foreign Assets as Percentage of Total Gold and Foreign Assets Holdings
of Twenty-Nine Central Banks
End of: 1929 1931 1934 1935
Australia 30.2 55.9 98.7 98.4
E9ypt 88.1 81.5 72.7 76.7
Albania 90.5 75.5 61.4 60.2
India 67.4 42.1 65.3 65.5
Finland 69.3 65.9 81.6 73.7
Sweden 52.0 19.2 61.2 60.7
Ecuador 84.1 63.6 38.3 7.9
Austria 79.7 42.5 22.1 38.9
Hungary 32.9 18.8 30.8 47.5
Norway 31.1 12.6 23.2 20.0
Union of South Africa 46.8 na 32.1 30.9
Bulgaria 45.5 14.5 7.3 22.0
Portugal 66.3 64.3 21.7 24.9
Latvia 70.1 31.7 7.9 13.7
Estonia 78.9 70.8 22.5 14.3
Colombia 40.7 33.7 11.7 14.2
Roumania 42.5 3.2 10.6 15.3
Czechoslovakia 64.3 39.1 7.9 2.9
Spain 3.8 11.0 11.1 11.1
Lithuania 69.2 39.8 13.8 32.8
Peru 11.2 28.3 10.1 16.4
Poland 42.8 26.2 5.3 5.7
Danzig 100.0 53.9 11.0 30.7
France 38.5 23.9 1.2 2.0
Switzerland 37.2 4.2 0.4 0.5
Chile 85.9 48.7 1.1 0.9
Italy 49.8 27.8 1.2 10.8
Netherlands 32.9 8.9 0.1 0.3
Belgium 33.0 0 0 0
na =notavailable.
Source: League of Nations (1937).—6-
holding exchange reserves. Countries holding London balances which had
previously harbored no doubts about the stability of reserve currencies
learned an expensive lesson from sterling's devaluation and altered their
behavior accordingly. For example, after having lost 25 per cent of the
domestic value of its £12 million sterling reserve, the National Bank of
Belgium quickly moved to liquidate its dollar balances.13 When speculative
pressure shifted from sterling to the dollar, such Eastern European countries
as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria also shif ted their balances out of New
York.14 As one contemporary expert observed, "The risks involved in currency
depreciation have been very forcibly --andfor some gold exchange central
banks, disastrously --demonstratedduring the recent period."15
In this paper I provide the 'first systematic analysis of the
international distribution of gold and foreign-exchan9e reserves under the
interwar gold-exchange standard with which these issues can be addressed. I
analyze both the exceptional behavior of the U.S. and France and the shift out
of foreign exchange after 1930. While both U.S. and French gold policies and
systemic weaknesses of the exchange standard emerge as important factors in
explaining the international distribution of reserves, the first of these
factors turns out to play the more important role in the monetary stringency
associated with the Depression.16
It is important to bear in mind the implications of this analysis for the
literature on the Great Depression. A number of authors have emphasized
international aspects of the Depression, arguing that the boom and slump are
properly understood not simply as an outcome of misguided U.S. policy but as
a result of an unstable international system subjected to a shock to-7-
confidence.17 One way in which "international interactions across boundaries"
could have magnified an initial disturbance was through the collapse of the
international monetary system. Convertibility crises, forced devaluations and
a loss of confidence in the stability of reserve currencies, by inducing
central banks to shift out of foreign assets reduced the stock of
international reserves available to back domestic liabilities. If the
availability of reserves remained a constraint on monetary authorities'
willingness to increase national money supplies, then the collapse of the
gold-exchange standard and the liquidation of foreign-exchange reserves would
have limited the scope for ref lation and exacerbated the money stringency that
contributed to the severity of the Depression.18
Alternatively, if Federal Reserve and Banque de France policies leading
to the concentration of gold in the US, and France rather than the scramble
for gold unleashed by the gold-exchange standard's disintegration were
primarily responsible for exacerbating monetary stringency throughout the
world, then responsibility for the Depression should be assigned not to
systemic weaknesses of the gold-exchange standard system but to misguided
national policies. Note, however, that the national policies blamed for the
Depression need not be limited to the United States and still may be
transmitted across national borders by the international monetary system.
Finally, it is possible that this entire emphasis on international
monetary forces is misplaced. If the collapse of the gold-exchange standard,
the liquidation of foreign assets and the advent of exchange-rate flexibility
offered central banks the opportunity to free their monetary policies from the
reserve constraint, they could have chosen to initiate an expansionary-8-
response to the Depression regardless of the state of international reserves.
Were this the case, international aspects of the Depression would have had to
operate through different channels than those emphasized in the literature on
international monetary forces.
This focus on external constraints on domestic monetary policies is not
new.19 However, previous studies which have acknowledged the role of external
constraints have analyzed them on a national basis rather than considering
global monetary conditions and the global availability of reserves as factors
in the global Depression. Even if national policies rather than systemic
failures ultimately prove dominant in the explanation for the Great
Depression, an implication of this paper is that their effects can only be
fully understood when analyzed in an international setting.
I. The Mechanics of the Gold Exchange Standard
Had the interwar gold-exchange standard possessed a birth certificate, it
would have read 'born in Genoa during the Economic and Financial Conference of
1922.' The distinguishing feature of the new monetary regime was not the
practice by central banks of holding foreign currency reserves, for many
countries, particularly smaller ones and members of the British Empire, had
done so on a substantial scale prior to 1913.20 The significance of Genoa lay
rather in the effort to institutionalize and encourage the practice. The
Financial Commission of the Genoa Conference proposed the adoption of an
international monetary convention, formally entitling countries "in addition
to any gold reserve held at home, [to] maintain in any other participant—9-
country reserves of approved assets in the form of bank balances, bills,
short-term securities, or other suitable liquid resources."21 Participating
countries were required to fix their exchange rates against one another, with
any failing to do so losing the right to hold the reserve balances of other
participants. Foreign exchange would be used in the same manner as gold to
settle accounts and defend exchange rates. The principal creditor nations
were encouraged to take early steps to "establish a free market in gold and
thus become gold centres" where the bulk of foreign-exchange reserves would be
held.
If the official convention advocated by the Financial Committee failed to
materialize, it nonetheless exercised considerable influence over the
practices of central banks.22 The first effect of the Genoa resolutions was to
encourage the adoption of statutes permitting central banks to back notes and
sight deposits with foreign exchange as well as gold. Central banks of
countries that stabilized their currencies with League of Nations assistance,
including Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece, were empowered to hold the
entirety of their reserves in convertible foreign bills and balances. The
newly created Latin American central banks designed by Kemmerer Commissions
were permitted to hold both gold and foreign exchange, generally in
proportions of their choosing. Various restrictions were placed on the form
of eligible exchange reserves: the reserve of new Central Bank of Chile, for
example, was to consist of gold coin and bars in the vaults of the Bank,
earmarked gold abroad, and deposits payable in gold on demand in banks of high
standing in London and New York. In the later 1920s, the statutes adopted by
newly created or reformed central banks tended to require that a specified—1 O-
minimum proportion of total reserves be held in the form of gold; these
proportions ranged from 33 per cent in Albania to 75 per cent in Belgium,
Poland and Germany.23 Finally, a number of the older central banks retained
long-standing regulations requiring them to back their liabilities exclusively
with gold. Central banks whose eligible reserves were limited to gold
included those of Denmark, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and, of
course, the two reserve currency countries, the United States and the United
Kingdom.24
Statutes regulating central banks also differed in the amount of backing
required. Most of the older central banks, exemplified by the Bank of England
and the Norges Bank, were required to back only notes in circulation but,
after an exemption for the fiduciary issue (a certain fixed quantity of
notes), to maintain 100 per cent cover on the margin. Newer banks, as well as
such older institutions as the Netherlands Bank and Banque de France which had
modernized their statutes, typically had no fiduciary issue but were required
instead to hold proportional backing against liabilities, on the order of 35
or 40 per cent. This was viewed as a useful method of economizing on the use
of gold. But the statutes requiring proportional reserves often extended the
definition of liabilities to be backed to include not only notes but in
addition sight deposits at the central bank, an amendment which tended to
increase the use of reserves.25 According to one expert, the move to
proportional backing and the requirement to back sight liabilities other than
notes had roughly offsetting effects on the global demand for international
reserves 26
The upshot of these regulations was that there existed under the—11—
gold—exchange standard a stable if somewhat flexible relationship between
international reserves and the domestic monetary base. Although that
relationship differed across countries and was more elastic than under a gold
coin or even a gold bullion standard, it existed nonetheless. It existed as
much because of convention as official regulation, since statute provided only
a general guide as to the relationship between money supplies and reserves.
The minimum 9old cover, for example, was under normal circumstances never
employed. Banks of issue attempted to maintain excess reserves over their
minimum legal requirements, typically on the order of 7 to 10 percent of
liabilities.27 Not only was this prudent banking practice, but it provided
leeway for open market operations designed to insulate the domestic economy
from the impact on domestic money supplies of gold outf lows.28 Moreover, the
minimum was not always binding. Some banks of issue, including those of
Austria, Chile, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, were entitled, upon payment of a
special tax, to temporarily reduce their gold cover ratios below the statutory
minimum. Denmark and South Africa required only a special government permit.
In Salvador the central bank was merely required to raise its discount rate by
half a percentage point f or each per cent by which its reserve fell below 30
per cent.29 Similarly, the proportions in which central banks held gold and
exchange reserves only loosely followed statutory regulation. Some central
banks entitled to hold foreign exchange chose not to do so. Others without
this right chose to maintain lar9e amounts of exchange outside their legal
reserve.
Critics of this system noted the wide variation across countries in the
relation of gold reserves to money supplies, arguing that in principle "the—12—
gold which a central bank holds ought to have no particular relation to its
note issue."3° They were especially critical of the practice of holding excess
reserves. They admitted, however, that so long as other central banks
maintained conventional backing ratios, public confidence in any one country's
currency hinged upon its continuing to do the same. A solution to this
problem was to arrange an internationally coordinated reduction in cover
ratios which would not undermine confidence in any particular currency.31 In
practice, the major central banks could not be brought to cooperate in such
action.
Even most of those countries which went off the gold standard following
the onset of the Great Depression maintained gold cover ratios not far
different from those which had traditionally prevailed, either because of
statutory requirements or out of concern to prevent depreciation due to
loss of confidence. Some countries, including of course the members of the
gold bloc, simply left their cover regulations unchanged. In contrast, Germany
and Italy suspended central bank reserve requirements in 1932 and 1935,
respectively. Although four countries with a fixed fiduciary system varied
the amount of the maximum uncovered issue, most of those variations were
small. The Bank of England's limit was raised from £260 million to £275
million or August 1st, 1931, in response to pressure on sterling, and returned
to £260 million on March 31st, 1933, when the dollar was under attack. The
Bank of Sweden's was raised from 250 to 350 million kroner in 1933 to
facilitate an expansion of the domestic money supply. The most dramatic
change was that of Japan, where the limit was raised in 1932 from 120 to 1000
million yen. Of the proportional reserve countries, legal cover ratios were—13-
lowered by Austria in 1932 (from 24 to 20 per cent), by Danzig in 1935 (from
40 to 30 per cent), and in 1936 by Denmark, Bulgaria and Latvia (from 33 1/3
to 25 per cent, from 33 1/3 to 25 per cent, and from 50 to 30 per cent,
respectively) 32
An implication of the preceding discussion is that the positive
association between domestic money supplies and international reserves
depended ultimately on central bank preferences rather than the mechanical
linkages posited by theoretical models of the gold standard. What then
determined the preferences of central banks? Contemporary observers such as
Keynes, Gayer and Nurkse argued that the basic motivation for holding reserves
was precautionary, deriving from the desire to smooth the impact of temporary
fluctuations in export earnings on the capacity to purchase imports. They
suggested that deviations of the reserve proportion from the 33 to 40 per cent
norm were explicable in terms of costs and benefits of financing instead of
adjusting to temporary disturbances to the balance of payments. As Charles
Hardy put it, "The size of the gold stock which a country needs depends on the
size and also on the character of the probable gold movements out of the
country."33 Arthur D. Gayer termed this "the magnitude of the probable
external drain,., the amount a country is likely to require for equalizing the
balance of its international payments in the interval during which corrective
measures are being applied internally to remove the causes of the gold export
and thus restore equilibrium."34
Observers agreed that agricultural producers, particularly those whose
exports were heavily concentrated in a single crop, were especially vulnerable
to fluctuations in export earnings and therefore in need of additional-14-
reserves to insure their ability to purchase imports.35 They noted that, along
with countries with highly variable exports, those with large shares of
exports and imports in GNP had reason to maintain additional reserves, since
the costs of responding to an export shortfall by foregoing imports were
highest where trade was most important. At the same time, they acknowledged
that the precautionary motive for holding reserves was a luxury good. Nurkse
likened the demand for reserves to the individual's demand for cash balances.
"A rich man can afford and will probably want to hold a large idle cash
reserve, while a poor man will not. In the same way a poor country is less
likely than a rich one to sacrifice potential imports and to tie up some of
its limited wealth in an international cash reserve."36
Readers will note the resemblance of these interwar analyses to modern
discussions of optimal international reserves.37 Attempts to estimate models
of optimal reserves specify the demand for reserves as a function of income,
openness and some measure of balance-of-payments variability. The
specification estimated by Frenkel (1974) is typical:
(1) r=a0+a1t+a2s+a3y
where r is reserves, t is the import-to--GNP ratio, s is balance-of-payments
variability measure, y is GNP, and the a1 are parameters to be estimated. The
expectation is that a1, a2 and a3 are positive. The specification suggested
by the above discussion differs only by the addition of a measure of domestic
monetary base h:
(2) r=a0+a1t+a2s+a3y+a4h—15-
where a4, the cover ratio, is positive.38 Variants of this specification are
estimated below.
The internal consistency of inferences about the effects of a decline in
willingness to hold exchange reserves and/or a rise in the central bank demand
for gold can be analyzed theoretically by embedding eq. (2) in a model like
that which informs P4urkse's (1944) discussion. Since I am concerned with the
impact of global reserves on global money supply and global income, the
framework for analysis is, as in Barro (1979), a model of the world economy
under fixed exchange rates. Although it is straightforward to analyze the
impact of changes in the supply and demand for reserves in a multicountry
setting, as in Eichengreen and Sachs (1986), for present purposes the
multicountry analysis is unnecessarily elaborate.
The first equation, the demand for reserves, is eq. (2) above. r now
measures global reserves, y global income, etc., and all variables are
expressed in nominal terms. (For simplicity, remaining equations will also be
expressed nominal form.)
Total reserves are the sum of gold g and foreign-exchange f:
(3) g=a0+o1t+a2s+c3y+a4h
(4) f=70+71t+y2s+73y+y4h
where a1 =+ ' (i=O1, 2, 3, 4) and r =g+f.While the global supply
of monetary 9old g is exogenously fixed (hence ignoring mining and nonmonetary
uses of gold), the supply of exchange reserves f is demand determined.39
The demand for nominal money balances is assumed to take Cambridge
transactions demand form:—16-
(5) m=Ay
The broadly-defined money supply can be decomposed into the base and the
multiplier,
(6) m=*0+*1h
Equations (3) through (6) and the identity r =g+f(equivalently (2)
and the coefficient restrictions) determine five endogenous variables; r, f,
h, m and one to be selected. It is not obvious why openness or export
variability might be affected by financial market conditions, and in any case
such effects are remote from the questions at hand. Income is therefore the
logical remaining endogenous variable.
It is useful to consider how this approach compares to conventional
models of the money supply process under the gold standard. The textbook
model of the gold standard, as in McCloskey and Zecher (1976) or Barro (1979),
assumes that the money supply m bears a fixed relationship to the stock of
reserves r:
(7) m=Or
In contrast to (7), eqs. (1) and (2) focus on the relationship of reserves to
the monetary base rather than to the broadly-defined money supply. They
introduce other variables affecting the link between reserves and the base and
leave open the possibility that other factors may influence the relationship
between the base and broad monetary aggregates. In addition, eq. (2) differs
from conventional treatments of the monetary base by not explicitly mentioning—17—
that the base is the sum of domestic credit and foreign reserves. This
difference is apparent rather than real, however, since domestic credit is
simply the difference between h and r, and the implicit central bank reaction
function determining credit can be derived by solving (2) for h -r.4°In
treating foreign exchange as a component of international reserves, this paper
differs from Fremling (1985, p. 1183), who questions this procedure on the
grounds that "what is a foreign reserve asset for one country is an equally
sized liability for another." As the framework of this section makes clear,
the import of this observation hinges on the form in which foreign reserves
were held. When they were held as government securities, they do not need to
be netted out of the money supply available to domestic residents, and the
argument has no force. When they were held as deposits in commercial banks,
they should be subtracted from m. But since m is a multiple of h and h is a
multiple of r, any such adjustment has only minor implications for the
analysis conducted here.
I consider the impact on income of two exogenous shocks: a shift out of
foreign exchange into gold (d'y0 =-do0
<0),and a decline in the willingness
to hold foreign exchange not accompanied by a rise in the demand for gold
(dy0 <0).
The effects of the latter are particularly simple. Since the stock of
exchange reserves is demand determined while stock of gold reserves is
exogenously given, the monetary base is determined by eq. (3) alone. The base
determines the money supply through (6), which determines nominal income
through (5). Changes in y0, i.e. in the willingness to hold foreign exchange
reserves, have no impact on h and therefore no Implications for m or y. A-18-
decline in the demand for foreign exchange not accompanied by a rise in the
demand for gold therefore has no direct effect on money supply or income,
since the supply of foreign exchange simply adjusts to accommodate it.




which is negative, assuming the denominator to be positive (a necessary
condition for an increase in gold to be expansionary). The shift into gold
(do0> 0)reduces the monetary base that can be supported by a given gold
supply. The consequent decline in income increases with the elasticity of
money supply with respect to the base and the income elasticity of demand
for gold 03 and falls with the income elasticity of money demand X and the
elasticity of gold demand with respect to the base a4. Thus, what is crucial
is not whether the demand for foreign exchange fell significantly after 1929
but whether any such fall was accompanied by a rise in the demand for gold.
II. Empirical Analysis
Despite the popularity of the explanation that ascribes the concentration
of gold reserves to the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the United States and
France and the growing reliance on gold rather than foreign exchange to the
uncertainties created by the gold standard's collapse, it is not obvious that
observed movements in the distribution of reserves reflect these factors
rather than the effects of changes in incomes, balance-of-payments variability—19-
and openness which normally affect the demand for reserves, especially since
the Great Depression was marked by dramatic fluctuations in all three
variables. Merely to note, as did the Gold Delegation of the League of
Nations, that in 1928 a mere 15 countries held over 90 percent of the world's
monetary gold reserves does not establish the existence of a problem. As
Nurkse expressed the point somewhat later, "the fact that the distribution of
reserves was highly unequal in the later 'thirties does not itself prove that
it did not represent an equilibrium position from the point of view of the
individual countries concerned, given the existing structure of basic
conditions."41
In order to analyze the international distribution of reserves and its
determinants, I estimate demands for gold and foreign exchange by 24 countries
using a specification based on eq. (2). To test the hypothesis that the U.S.
and France held reserves in excess of those which can be ascribed to the
normal determinants of reserve demand, I introduce dummy variables for these
countries. To test the hypothesis that the years after 1930 witnessed a
liquidation of foreign exchange reserves, with or without an accompanying
shift into gold, I introduce dummy variables for individual years.
The sample of countries included in the econometric analysis was dictated
by data availability. Some countries were excluded because of the lack of
reasonable national income estimates, others because the absence of a central
bank meant that information on money and foreign reserves was not provided on
a compatible basis. Nonetheless, most of the important repositories of gold
and foreign assets are included in the sample.42 Note that the sample of
countries is not the same as in Table 2.-20-
Data on reserves are taken from the Statistical Bulletins and Monetay
Reviews of the League of Nations, which draw in turn on published returns of
central banks.43 I utilize figures on the book value of gold and exchange
reserves of central monetary institutions (apart from Exchange Equalization
Funds) at the end of calendar years. Gold reserves are valued at legal
parities. Although the paper value of gold exceeded its book value in
countries which continued to value that specie at par despite having
depreciated their exchange rates, I only revalue these reserves when this was
done by the central bank itself, since this was when capital gains on gold
were reflected in the central bank's backing ratio.44
In contrast to gold, foreign assets are valued at market rates, since
this was the practice of central banks. As already noted, a number of central
banks functioned under restrictions on what type of foreign assets qualified
for backing liabilities. Most of these countries held their foreign assets
exclusively in eligible form. But for a small minority, there was a
difference between the total and eligible foreign assets of the monetary
authorities. Since total foreign assets is the more encompassing measure of
exchange reserves, in those few cases where the two figures differed, the
total was used. The two exceptions are Germany and Denmark, which reported
negative total foreign assets (but positive eligible assets) for selected
years.45 Since it is impossible to analyze these negative figuresusing the
standard specification which takes as its dependent variable the log of
foreign reserves, for those years where total foreign assets were negative,
eligible foreign assets were used instead.
Except for data for the U.S. and U.K., which are drawn from U.S.-21—
Department of Commerce (1976) and Feinstein (1972), respectively, the
remaining variables are assembled from sources described in the appendix to
Eichengreen and Portes (1986). The share of imports in GNP is used as the
measure of openness, note circulation as the measure of the monetary base, and
the variance of exports over three years (centered upon the year for which the
dependent variable is defined) as the measure of balance—of—payments
variability.
Since the controversy surrounding the international distribution of gold
centers on the years 1931-33, the period spanned by the 1931 devaluation of
sterling and the 1933 devaluation of the dollar, I estimate the model for a
period bracketing those years: 1929-35. 1929 is the first year following the
revaluation of the Banque de France's gold stock and France's official return
to gold, events commonly taken to indicate that reconstruction of the
international monetary system was complete, while 1935 is the last year before
the collapse of the gold bloc and final demise of the gold-exchange standard.
Equation (2) is estimated using two-stage least squares to account for
the endogeneity of money. The appropriate instruments are the arguments of
the demand for money function, taken to be income, the opportunity cost of
holding money, and lagged money balances.46 Results for individual years and
for the entire period 1929-35 are reported in Table 3. The demand for
reserves is an increasing function of log GNP, the import share and export
variability, as in modern estimates of models of optimal international
reserves. With the exception of export variability, the coefficients
consistently exceed zero at the 90 percent confidence level or better. Even
the coefficient on export variability is consistent with modern estimates, inTable 3. Demand for Reserves: Equilibrium Model
(Dependent variable is log of gold


































































































Two—stage least squares estimates. t-statistics in parentheses.
All variables are measured in millions of units of domestic currency.
Instruments for log money are inflation and log money lagged.
Variable definitions:
Import share: imports/GNP
Export Variability: variance of exports over t—1, t, t+1.
Source: See text.—22-
which the coefficient on balance-of-payments variability tends to be
unstable.
Changes in money consistently exhibit the anticipated positive
association with the demand for reserves. The pooled time-series cross-
section estimate suggests for the entire period a gold and foreign exchange
cover of 21 per cent on the margin, confirming that, despite their maintenance
of excess reserves, central banks were concerned to increase their reserves
when increasing money supplies. However, both the size of the coefficient and
its statistical significance tend to decline over time, suggesting that once
countries began to leave the gold standard in 1931 the links between money
supplies and international reserves were loosened. This is consistent with
the steps, described above, to alter but not eliminate legal cover ratios.
consider below whether the link between money supplies and international
reserves loosened significantly as the period progressed, and whether shifts
in this linkage were sufficient to neutralize the potential impact on money
supplies factors constricting the availability of reserves.
These four economic characteristics of countries explain a large share of
international distribution of reserves, ranging from 86 to 97 per cent
depending on year and averaging 90 per cent over the period. In other words,
it may be unnecessary to appeal to exceptional French and American appetites
for gold or to the collapse of the gold-exchange standard to account for the
observed distribution.
This specification does not explicitly test the hypothesis that the
observed distribution of reserves was an equilibrium allocation. This may be
a significant omission since, in a period marked by convertibility crises andTable 4. Demand for Reserves: Disequilibrium Model
(Dependent variable is log of gold
plus foreign exchange reserves)
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Note: Two-stage least squares estimates with t-statistics in parentheses.
Source: See text.-23-
unanticipated devaluations, countries may have been unable to maintain their
desired reserve stocks. To test this hypothesis, the rate of change of the
exchange rate over the preceding period is added to the model.48 The exchange
rate is measured as a percentage of its 1929 gold parity, so negative values
signify depreciation.49 The sign of its coefficient is theoretically
ambiguous: if devaluation was forced, as was the case for several primary
producers in 1929-30, then depreciation should be associated with reserve
losses and the coefficient should be positive; but if devaluation was
voluntary, as in the case of the U.S. depreciation of 1933-34, then
depreciation should be associated with reserve gains and the coefficient
should be negative.
The results of estimating the disequilibrium model are reported in
Table 4. The only year for which the coefficient on depreciation differs
significantly from zero is 1929, when countries forced to depreciate held
reserves significantly less than desired.5° In general, the results tend to
support the equilibrium specification.
In Tables 5 and 6 I estimate separately the demand for the two components
of international reserves: monetary gold and foreign assets. Consider first
the pooled time-series cross-section results. Both demands depend positively
on income, openness and export variability. While the coefficients on export
variability again exhibit instability, their movement displays no obvious
pattern. However, only gold and not foreign exchange reserves are
consistently related to the size of national money supplies at standard
significance levels, especially after 1930. This result is broadly consistent
with the views of Nurkse (1944): since the primary objective of backing theTable 5. Demand for Gold Reserves

































































































Note Two—stage least squares estimates with t-statistics in parentheses.
Source: See text.—24-
note circulation was "to maintain confidence in the currency," Nurkse
suggested that backing for notes would tend to be held in the
confidence-inspiring form of gold, while reserves maintained for other
purposes would be held in the form of foreign exchange as well.51 The Table 5
coefficients on money supplies are significantly greater than zero at the 90
percent level or better for every year except the last and tend to decline
over time. While in Table 6 there appears to be no association between
exchange reserves and money supplies after 1930, contrary to Nurkse there is
weak evidence of an association in the gold standard years 1929-30. It
appears that both gold and foreign exchange were used to smooth external
transactions and, to a lesser extent for gold than foreign exchange, to back
the central bank's domestic liabilities during the period of the global
gold-exchange standard; once that standard began to collapse, however, while
gold was still held both to smooth external transactions and to provide
backing for money supplies, foreign assets were held only for the first of
these purposes.
Table 7, where dummy variables for the U.S. and France are added, can be
used to assess the contention that the Federal Reserve and the Banque de
France held reserves in excess of those explicable by their economic
characteristics and normal patterns of central bank behavior.52 It is not
clear that the proper interpretation of this contention is that the two
countries held disproportionate quantities of global reserves or
disproportionate quantities of gold. The results lend support to both
interpretations. From the third equation, U.S. gold reserves were fully
110 percent and French gold reserves 280 percent above levels that can beTable 6. Demand for Foreign Exchange Reserves
(Dependent variable is log of
foreign exchange reserves)
Import





1929 —5.605 0.930 5.992 11.01 0.127 .94 20
(5.64) (7.45) (5.10) (2.04) (1.51)
1930 —6.207 0.955 5.481 1.335 0.221 .91 20
(4.77) (5.40) (4.02) (0.84) (1.98)
1931 —5.509 0.916 4.855 2.626 0.083 .88 20
(3.95) (4.98) (2.40) (2.05) (0.72)
1932 —3.617 0.806 2.773 6.306 0.001 .74 20
(2.08) (3.51) (0.63) (1.27) (0.01)
1933 —3.352 0.853 —0.682 9.80 —0.114 .59 20
(1.63) (2.80) (0.21) (1.32) (0.58)
1934 —4.361 0.951 3.197 8.74 —0.187 .51 20
(1.62) (2.86) (0.54) (0.69) (0.87)
1935 —5.427 1.021 2.771 6.85 —0.056 .60 20
(2.03) (3.06) (0.42) (0.42) (0.26)
1929-35 —5.298 0.960 5.055 3.513 0.001 .70 140
(7.99) (10.53) (5.06) (2.93) (0.02)
Note: Two—stage least squares estimates with t-statistics in parentheses.
Source: See text.-25-
accounted for by their economic characteristics and the behavior typical of
the sample of countries.53 From the sixth equation, U.S. monetary gold stocks
were nearly three times and French gold stocks nearly five times those
predicted by the international cross section.54
These magnitudes are economically important in the context of the Great
Depression. Recall that in 1931 France and the United States possessed
between them some 60 per cent of the global stock of monetary gold. The
results in Table 7 suggest that, had France and the U.S. adhered to the same
patterns as other countries, their combined share would have been less than
one-quarter, almost exactly doubling the gold reserves of other countries.
Assuming that central banks were concerned to retain some proportion between
their reserves and domestic liabilities, like that shown in Tables 4 and 5,
and that they were constrained in their desire to ref late by the availability
of gold, this redistribution of reserves would have provided considerable
scope for an expansion of money supplies.
Table 8 adds dummy variables for years subsequent to 1929 to analyze
shifts over time in the willingness to hold reserve assets.55 The
interpretation of reserve movements which emphasizes the shift out of exchange
and into gold due to the collapse of the gold-exchange standard predicts
negative coefficients for later years in the demand-for-exchange-reserves
equations and significant positive coefficients in the equations for gold.
Only the first of these predictions receives strong support. Except in 1932,
the demand for exchange reserves is significantly lower in every year after
1930 than in 1929.56 As before, the orders of magnitude are striking: by 1931





Log Reserves LogGold Exchange
Constant -3.666—3.854—3.556 —3.687 —3.879—3.578 —5.368
(10.42) (10.92) (10.25) (9.53)(10.08) (9.44) (7.87)
Log GNP 0.857 0.863 0.840 0.771 0.774 0.753 0.966
(18.03) (17.72) (17.87) (14.36)(14.21) (14.28) (10.47)
Import Share 3.335 3.819 3.575 2.307 2.879 2.588 5.114
(6.43) (7.14) (6.93) (3.81) (4.68) (4.34) (5.06)
Export 0.148 1.819 0.228 —0.326 1.713—0.231 3.895
Variability (0.19) (2.84) (0.31) (0.35) (2.21) (0.25) (2.67)
Log Money 0.201 0.211 0.198 0.290 0.302 0.285 0.005
(6.33) (6.54) (6.35) (7.55) (7.81) (7.61) (0.08)
France 1.262 1.343 1.504 1.605 —0.321
(3.51) (3.80) (3.43) (3.74) (0.46)
U.S. 0.657 0.745 0.929 1.024
(2.30) (2.71) (2.70) (3.08)
R2 .91 .91 .91 .89 .88 .89 .70
n 154 154 154 168 168 168 140
Note: Pooled time-series cross-sections. Two-stage least squares estimates with
t-statistics in parentheses.
Source: See text.-26-
compared to 1929. This is more than a restatement of the fact that between
1929 and 1931 the share of foreign exchange in the reserves of 24 countries
fell from 37 to 19 percent (37 to 13 percent when France is excluded). It
establishes that the decline in income, contraction of trade and changes in
money supplies associated with the Depression cannot by themselves account for
this development.
The results do not provide compelling support for the contention that
this liquidation of foreign exchange was at the same time a shift into gold.
While in the equations f or gold the coefficients on 1930 and subsequent years
are uniformly positive, they tend to differ insignificantly from zero. On the
basis of these estimates one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the demand
for gold rose insignificantly at the same time the demand f or exchange
reserves fell. Unfortunately, neither do these results permit one to reject a
range of other equally plausible null hypotheses, such as that the demand for
gold rose by approximately a third. Evidence on this question must be judged
inconclusive. Nevertheless, on the basis of point estimates the exceptional
demands for gold by the U.S. and France contributed more to the global reserve
stringency than the liquidation of the gold—exchange standard.
The conclusion that the demand for gold reserves rose insignificantly is
entirely consistent with the finding that the demand for foreign exchange
fell. What may have happened starting in 1931 as a result of the gold
exchange standard's collapse was that countries reduced their propensities to
hold exchange reserves as backing for their money supplies without
substituting additional gold. The devaluations which led to the scramble out





Gold Log Foreign Assets
Constant -4.209 -3.845 -4.343 -3.962 —4.455 -4.484
(10.08) (9.48) (9.30) (8.80) (5.81) (5.69)
Log GNP 0.885 0.848 0.803 0.766 0.935 0.937
(17.80) (17.34) (14.26) (14.24) (10.28) (10.18)
Import Share 3.956 3.919 3.969 2.920 4.042 4.073
(6.89) (6.97) (4.50) (4.56) (3.80) (3.76)
Export 1.087 0.483 1.537 —0.239 3.332 3.488
Variability (2.80) (0.62) (1.90) (0.25) (2.73) (2.31)
Log Money 0.209 0.194 0.300 0.280 0.014 0.245
(6.33) (6.19) (7.50) (7.39) (0.22) (0.25)




1930 0.128 0.161 0.153 0.193 —0.065 -0.069
(0.59) (0.78) (0.60) (0.80) (0.16) (0.16)
1931 -0.030 0.020 0.192 0.253 —0.700 -0.705
(0.14) (0.10) (0.74) (1.03) (1.67) (1.67)
1932 0.258 0.263 0.411 0.417 -0.479 -0.477
(1.16) (1.24) (1.57) (1.69) (1.13) (1.12)
1933 0.328 0.304 0.326 0.298 —0.821 -0.816
(1.48) (1.44) (1.25) (1.21) (1.94) (1.92)
1934 0.248 0.227 0.237 0.210 —1.019 —1.014
(1.10) (1.05) (0.91) (0.85) (2.38) (2.35)
1935 0.312 0.293 0.361 0.338 —0.679 -0.674
(1.39) (1.37) (1.38) (1.37) (1.59) (1.57)
R2 .91 .92 .88 .89 .72 .72
n 154 154 168 168 140 140
Note: Pooled time-series cross—sections. Two-stage least squares estimates with
t-statistics in parentheses.
Source: See text.—27—
national money supplies. Rather than substituting gold for recently
liquidated foreign assets, some central banks appear to have simply reduced
their excess gold reserves.
Perhaps the strongest evidence against the hypothesis that there occurred
in the course of the 1930s an upward shift in the global demand for gold is
that the coefficients for 1930 and 1931 in the gold equations are virtually
indistinguishable. 1931 was the year of the most serious uncertainty due to
Continental financial crises, Central European exchange control, sterling
devaluation, and competitive depreciation, the year over which the share of
foreign exchange in the reserves of 23 European central banks fell from 35 to
19 per cent. If uncertainty ever increased the demand for gold, it should
have been between the ends of 1930 and 1931. That the point estimates of the
dummy variables for those years indicate increases of no more than five per
cent is difficult to reconcile with the gold-exchange—standard-liquidation
view.
This conclusion contrasts with the implications of the analysis of French
and American behavior. When the dummy variables for years are added to
Table 8, the coefficients on the dummy variables for France and the U.S.
remain positive and significant at the 99 per cent level in the equations for
both gold and total reserves. Because the practice of backing money supplies
with gold remained, the exceptional demands f or gold by the Federal Reserve
and Banque de France placed downward pressure on global money supplies. This
effect is large relative to any which might be ascribed to the liquidation of
the gold-exchange standard.-28-
III. Summary and Implications
This paper has presented the first systematic analysis of the
distribution of international reserves under the gold-exchange standard. The
demand for reserves has been shown to depend on, among other variables,
national money supplies. That dependence changed, however, in Important ways
after 1930. Where it had previously been the practice of gold-exchange
standard countries to back their money supplies with both foreign assets and
gold, the instability of reserve currencies caused central banks to liquidate
that portion of their reserve portfolios which had taken the form of foreign
assets. Had no other change in behavior occurred, this would have placed
downward pressure on money supplies. Yet the results of empirical analysis do
not permit us to rule out other changes sufficiently important to eliminate
any such effect. Instead of attempting to maintain the overall reserve
backing of their money supplies by substituting gold for foreign exchange,
central banks may have reduced their cover ratios to permit the maintenance of
previously establishedrelations between money supplies and gold reserves. It
is not clear that the deflationary linkage running from international monetary
instability to domestic financial stringency was operative.
But since central banks attempted on average to maintain previously
established ratios between money supplies and gold, any factor which reduced
the availability of gold reserves served as an impediment to monetary
expansion. Here the gold policies of the Federal Reserve and the Banque de
France emerged as crucial. According to the estimates provided here, the
exceptional policies of these two countries reduced the the gold reserves—29-
available to other countries by fully one half, an effect larger than any
which can be ascribed to the liquidation of the gold—exchange standard.
As noted in the introduction, these findings have clear implications for
the literature on monetary forces In the Great Depression. These implications
only emerge, however, when the demand for reserves and supply of money are
viewed on a global basis. Since central banks generally maintained a
relatively stable relationship between their money supplies and gold reserves,
any factor which constrained the availability of gold constrained their
ability, given regulations and attitudes, to engage in monetary ref lation.
U.S. and French gold policies must therefore share the blame for exacerbating
the monetary aspects of the Great Depression.
These findings also have implications f or the dichotomy between
explanations for the Great Depression which emphasize national policies and
those which emphasize the international system. They suggest that the
distinction is overdrawn. The conclusions of this paper are entirely
consistent with the view that the Depression can only be fully understood as a
global phenomenon. They support the notion that international considerations
were significant determinants of national monetary policies. But they suggest
that national monetary policies, rather than systemic features of the
international regime, were the source of the most important destabilizing
monetary impulse transmitted by the international system.
Another way of looking at these results is in terms of the debate over
the exchange-rate devaluations of the 1930s. Previously, Jeffrey Sachs and I
have argued, in contradistinction to the existing literature, that the
devaluations of the 1930s were useful ref lationary initiatives when taken—30-
individually, although as executed they had beggar-thy-neighbor effects
abroad.58 Had they been undertaken more widely, we speculated,they would have
had at worst no effects and at best extremely favorable effects, depending on
accompanying monetary measures. The only caveat to this conclusion lay in the
possibility that the uncoordinated manner in which devaluation was undertaken
created uncertainty which led to a shift out of exchange reserves and into
gold, putting downward pressure on global reserves and national money
supplies. The results reported here confirm the shift out of exchange
reserves, but provide no compelling support for the implication of
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R2 .90 .92 .88 .89 .73 .73
fl 154 154 168 168 140 140-31-
Footnotes
1. The phrase is from Brown (1940).
2. The leading exponent of the gold shortage theory was Gustav Cassel. A
summary of his views is Cassel (1932). The interpretation summarized in the
remainder of this paragraph is elaborated in Hardy (1936). Many of these
propositions are scrutinized below.
3.Between 1913 and 1926 the circulation of gold coins in Europe shrank from
9.9 to 0.2 million marks. Mlynarksi (1929), p. 72.
4.This statement refers to short-term liabilities. Palyi (1982),
pp. 125—126.
5. League of Nations (1932a), p. 190.
6.Committee on Finance and Industry (1931), cited in Palyi, p. 179.
7. League of Nations (1937), Tables V—VI; Eichengreen (1986), p. 65.
8.Mlynarksi (1929), chapter III.
9.Under the monetary law of 1928 which marked France's official return to
the gold standard, the Banque de France was no longer permitted to purchase
foreign exchange. When the law was passed, the Bank already possessed
contracts for foreign exchange for forward delivery. As these contracts
matured late in 1928, the Bank's foreign exchange holdings rose substantially
and, given the dubious legal status of these reserves, the French authorities
engaged in persistent efforts over the subsequent year to convert them into
gold. These efforts were renewed following sterling's depreciation in
September 1931.
10. These are the calculations of Nurkse (1944), p. 41 and Appendix II.
11. Nurkse (1944), pp. 34-35. This stability was especially pronounced among
countries that stabilized either very early or very late --thatis, among
those which stabilized before or together with Britain in 1925 and those which
did not carry out stabilization programs before 1929. Brown (1940), p. 737.
12. Withdrawing sterling balances remained straightforward even once the
pound was rendered inconvertible. Countries simply sold sterling for
convertible currencies on the London foreign exchange market at the current
rate and, if they wished, proceeded to convert those currencies into gold.
13. For example, the Netherlands Bank, in its Annual Report for 1931—32,
defended its failure to avoid losses on its London balances by joining the run
on sterling on the grounds that "Management were of opinion that they should
not do this because they were convinced that the British Government and the
Bank of England firmly intended to maintain the gold standard and to make the-32-
gold stock of the said Bank entirely available for this purpose. This
conviction was based on the conversations which Dr. Vissering and Dr. Tetrode
had with the Management of the Bank of England on August 26th, 1931, when
anxiety concerning the financial position of England began to prevail." Cited
in Brown (1940), pp. 1170-1171. On the National Bank of Belgium, see
Kindleberger (1973), pp. 161-168.
14. Nurkse (1944), pp. 39-40.
15. Pasvolsky (1933), p. 49.
16. In this paper I do not analyze the causes of the initial downturn, as
opposed to reasons for its singular depth and long duration; my central
concern is to analyze instead the response to that event. The argument that
follows is compatible with both real and monetary explanations for the initial
contraction, as advanced by Temin (1976) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963).
Nor do I explore the bases of the French and U.S. gold policies that emerge as
critical, not because they are unimportant but because, unlike the issues
addressed here, they are fully analyzed elsewhere. I have analyzed the
reasons for France's post—1928 import of gold in Eichengreen (1986). u.s.
policy is the subject of a considerable literature, including Wicker (1966),
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Kindleberger (1973).
17. See Kindleberger (1973). The phrase in the next sentence, "international
interactions across boundaries," is from Kindleberger (1986), p. 437.
18. The role of monetary stringency in the Depression is discussed, for
example, by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and, more recently, by Hamilton
(1986) for the U.S., Temin (1973) for Germany, and Jonung (1981) for Sweden.
19. Recent studies emphasizing the external constraint on monetary policy
include Eichengreen (1981) and Eichengreen, Watson and Grossman (1985) for the
U.K., Epstein and Ferguson (1984) for the U.S. and Temin (1971) for Germany.
20. Nurkse (1944), pp. 28—30; Lindert (1969), passim.
21. The text of the resolutions and related correspondence, from where this
paragraph's quotations are drawn, are to be found in United Kingdom (1924).
22. Nurkse (1944), p. 28.
23. In August 1930 the National Bank of Belgium shifted from a gold to a gold
bullion basis. Royal Institute (1931), p.134. This did not prevent it from
holding foreign exchange outside its eligible reserve, as described below.
24. This is a partial list. For a complete list of countries legally
permitted to hold only gold reserves and countries permitted to hold foreign
exchange, see League of Nations (1930b).-33-
25. The origin of these ratios is "somewhat obscure," in the words of C.H.
Kirsch, quoted in Royal Institute (1931), p.151. The regulations emulated
what legislators viewed as prudent banking practice, often taken to be
Bank of England practice prior to Peel's Act of 1844, when it was the Bank's
convention to maintain a 33 per cent cash reserve against notes and deposits.
Or as the League of Nations (1930), p.19 put it, "But the minimum reserves
which are required by law today are to a large extent the outcome, not of
these considerations, but of past tradition, of convention and habit, of the
natural fear which each individual legislature has that a departure from
general practice may impair confidence in the currency."
26. Palyi (1972), p. 125.
27. League of Nations (1930b), p. 14.
28. The major central banks, with the notable exception of the Banque de
France and National Bank of Switzerland, all possessed the power to
undertake open market operations. League of Nations (1938), p. 86.
29. Nurkse (1944), p. 95.
30. J.M. Keynes, quoted in Royal Institute (1931), p. 186.
31. This solution was suggested by the Gold Delegation of the League of
Nations (1932) and the Macmillan Committee (1931). See also Keynes (1929).
32. League of Nations (1938), pp. 87-89. The League mentions four other
countries which adopted more complicated measures to effect small reductions
in their cover ratios.
33. Hardy (1936), p. 96.
34. Gayer (1937), pp. 78—79.
35. Keynes, cited in Royal Institute (1931), p. 186; League of Nations
(1930b), p. 19; Nurkse (1944), p. 90.
36. Nurkse (1944), p. 90.
37. Contributions to this literature include Kenen and Vudin (1965), Heller
(1966) and Frenkel (1974).
38. The monetary variable used to explain movements in the demand for
reserves should be treated as endogenous since, unless gold and foreign
exchange flows are completely sterilized, disturbances affecting the stock of
reserves are likely to result in a change in the base. This, however, is a
matter of estimation rather than specification, and is considered further
below.—34-
39. Ignoring the impact on stocks of the flow supply of new gold is
appropriate only given a short time horizon. Fremling (1985) notes that there
was in fact a considerable flow supply of new monetary gold in the 1930s.
Since the issue of whether that new supply was or was not a response to
deflation induced changes in the real price of gold is distinct from the
issues with which this paper is concerned, the exogeneity assumption is
maintained throughout.





Alternatively, domestic credit can be written as a function of reserves and
other variables:
1-a4 a0a1 a2 a3 C= r-— - —t-—s-
a4 a4 a4 a4 a4
Since the sign of dc/dr is theoretically ambiguous, no implicit assumption is
necessarily made about whether central banks play by the "rules of the game."
41. Nurkse (1944), p. 93.
42. To facilitate the pooling of time series and cross section data, in the
final analysis I included only those countries for which data were obtained
for all years. Hence Belgium is excluded because income estimates are
available only for selected years. The countries analyzed are Austria,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Australia, Japan, Chile,
the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Rouniania, Spain, Sweden, Guatemala, El Salvador, and the
United States.
43. The main sources are League of Nations (1937) and League of Nations
(1939).
44. Attitudes toward revaluation and the toward the disposition of capital
gains are discussed in Eichengreen and Sachs (1985).
45. In the case of Germany, the difference is due to the $100 million loan
made in 1931 by the Bank for International Settlements, the Bank of England,
the Bank of France and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which was fully
repaid only in 1933. In the Danish case the discrepancy is due to an item
listed in the National Bank's balance sheet as correspondents abroad. The
results proved insensitive to the exclusion of these observations.
46. Since the variable to be instrumented is nominal money supply, the
instruments are nominal income and lagged nominal balances, along with the
opportunity cost variable. In the absence of market interest rates for the
entire sample of countries, the inflation rate is used to measure the
opportunity cost of holding money.-.35—
47. See the discussion in Kenen (1986). A possible explanation for this
problem is that export variability is only one component of balance-of-
payments variability. But studies which have used more comprehensive measures
of the balance of payments such as the variance of recent changes in the level
of reserves or the variability of detrended reserves are marked by the same
instability of coefficient estimates. A notable aspect of the results in
Table 2 is that the point estimate of the income elasticity of the demand for
reserves tends to be less than unity, rather than greater than unity as in
modern estimates and as suggested by the luxury good argument. This result is
attributable to the inclusion of log money as an additional explanatory
variable. The total elasticity of the demand for reserves with respect to
national income is the direct elasticity plus the income elasticity of money
demand times the coefficient on log money. If the income elasticity of money
demand is unity, the two coefficients simply can be added, yielding a total
income elasticity of demand for reserves on the order of 1.1.
48. Edwards (1983) estimates a similar specification, including a dummy
variable for years preceding a devaluation and interpreting the coefficient
estimate of -0.3 as suggesting that, prior to devaluation, reserves were some
30 percent below desired levels.
49. This follows Eichengreen and Sachs (1985). More precisely, it is
measured as the change in the annual average exchange rate between the
current and preceding years. Since reserves are measured at the end of the
year, the use of annual average exchange rates should minimize simultaneity
bias due to the impact of changes in reserves on changes in the exchange
rate.
50. In contrast, in 1931, a year marked by major convertibility crises, the
disequilibrium model adds nothing to the explanation provided by the
equilibrium version. A plausible explanation for this failure is that the
variable conflates the effects of Britain's convertibiTity crisis, which
should yield a positive coefficient, and the effects of simultaneous
devaluations by countries attempting to protect their shares of British
markets, which should yield a negative coefficient. However, adding a dummy
variable for Britain interacted with the rate of depreciation variable does
not change the result.
51. Nurkse (1944), p. 96 and passim.
52. It might be argued that a dummy variable for the U.K. should also be
included to pick up any effects associated with its (and America's) reserve
currency roles (and their liabilities to the outside world). Adding such a
variable yields a uniformly insignificant coefficient, with a t—statistic of
0.45 in the pooled equation in Table 4 and one of 0.27 in the third equation
of Table 7, for example. In the latter instance the coefficients on
individual years remain uniformly insignificant.
53. Since the dummy variables for France and the U.S. are 1.343 and 0.745,
respectively, the gold reserves are e1343 3.83 and e0'7452.11 times
those predicted by their characteristics and the average behavior of other
countries.-36-
54. In contrast, French exchange reserves differ insignificantly from those
of other countries with similar characteristics.
55. An alternative specification is to interact the dummy variables foryears
with money, under the assumption that what shifted over time was not the
average propensity to hold reserves but their elasticity with respect to the
money supply. Since the results of estimating this alternative specification,
shown in the appendix, are virtually indistinguishable from the results of
estimating the basic specification only the latter are discussed in the text.
56. The coefficients differ significantly from zero at the 95 percent level
for the one-tail test and at the 90 per cent level for the two—tail test.
57. e°7 .496.
58. Eichengreen and Sachs (1985).—37-
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